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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Eric Harold Ewell appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred by dismissing
one of his claims because the court misperceived that claim and wrongfully concluded
that it could have been raised on appeal and that it was not meritorious.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Ewell's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err by dismissing one of Mr. Ewell's claims because it misperceived
the nature of that claim?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Dismissing One Of Mr. Ewell's Claims Because It
Misperceived The Nature Of That Claim

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ewell asserts that, because the district court misperceived the nature of his

claim regarding ineffectiveness of his appellate attorney, the district court improperly
granted summary dismissal as to this claim.

B.

The District Court Erred By Dismissing One Of Mr. Ewell's Claims Because It
Misperceived The Nature Of That Claim
The State has raised three defenses to Mr. Ewell's claim on appeal: 1) that the

claim was not properly raised in the petition for post-conviction relief; 2) the claim may
not be raised for the first time on appeal; and 3) any error is harmless. Mr. Ewell will
address all of the State's assertions.

1.

The Claim Was Properly Before The Court

The State asserts that, because the facts in support of the claim are raised only
in Mr. Ewell's affidavit, rather than in the petition, the claim was not properly before the
district court.

(Respondent's Brief, p.10.)

The State is incorrect.

In his petition,

Mr. Ewell asserted that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. (R., p.4.) He further
alleged that "counsel admitted shortcomings."

(R., p.4.)

A claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is a claim of a Sixth Amendment violation.

See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Therefore, Mr. Ewell, in his petition, asserted a Sixth
Amendment claim and then properly used his affidavit to support that claim with facts.

3

Moreover, the district court was clearly aware that Mr. Ewell was supplementing
his petition with facts in his affidavit, as it considered the claim that Stuart v. State, 145
Idaho 467 (Ct. App. 2007), should have been overruled, which is not asserted in
Mr. Ewell's petition, but only in his affidavit. (See, e.g., R., p.133; cf R., pp.3-7.) The
State also acknowledges as much in its brief, where it states that the district court
treated allegations raised in the affidavit as claims of a double jeopardy violation.
(Respondent's Brief, p.7 n.1.) The district court considered the assertions raised in the
petition as alleging claims.

Mr. Ewell properly used his affidavit to supplement his

petition with assertions of fact. The claim at issue on appeal was properly before the
district court.

2. The Issue May Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal
The State asserts that the court specifically addressed the factual allegations
underpinning the ineffective assistance of counsel claims it deemed raised in Ewell's
petition - i.e., that counsel was ineffective in relation to the presentence investigation
and evaluation processes. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) The State acknowledges that
the district court "did not address the factual allegation in Ewell's affidavit that trial
counsel failed to 'preserve the primary issues for appeal when [he] did not renew the
motion to dismiss after the state amended the information (concerning the Prior Misd.
Charge) {R., p.74)." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Despite acknowledging that the district
court did not address the factual allegation in the affidavit that is at issue on appeal, the
State asserts that "Ewell cannot complain for the first time on appeal that the court
misperceived the allegations of his petition." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) The State's
argument is without merit.

4

First, the State acknowledges that a petitioner need not respond to the district
court's notice of intent to dismiss in order to preserve a claim that the petition was
improperly dismissed. (Respondent's Brief, p.15. (citing Gatza v. State, 139 Idaho 533
(2003)). Nevertheless, the State asserts that, pursuant to DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho
599, 601-02 (2009), "where, as here, a represented petitioner receives notice of the
bases for dismissal and fails to respond, he cannot later claim on appeal that petition
was dismissed without adequate notice." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.)
However, as DeRushe is limited to circumstances in which the State files a
motion for dismissal as opposed to where, as here, the court filed a notice of intent to
dismiss, the State's argument lacks merit. In Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517 (2010), the
Supreme Court noted that, "DeRushe clearly holds than appellant may not challenge
the sufficiency of the notice contained the state's motion for summary disposition,
and accompanying memoranda, for the first time on appeal." Id. at 521-22 (emphasis
added). The DeRushe court left the Gatza rule intact.

DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 602.

Because this case deals with the contents of a court's notice of intent to dismiss, the
rule in Gatza applies and the claim may be raised for the first time on appeal.
Further, the notice was insufficient.

In the order dismissing the petition, the

district court set forth what it believed the claim to be and then asserts, "[Mr. Ewell] did
not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or evidence." (R., p.121
(emphasis added).) While the court generally stated that Mr. Ewell's claims were not
supported by evidence, it was concluded that the specific claims it was addressing were
not supported by the evidence. The State acknowledges that the district court "did not
address the factual allegation in Ewell's affidavit that trial counsel failed to 'preserve the
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primary issues for appeal when [he] did not renew the motion to dismiss after the state
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amended

the

information

(concerning

the

Misd.

Charge)

(R.,

p.74)."

(Respondent's Brief, p.14.) The court therefore failed to give proper (or any) notice of
intent to dismiss the claim at issue on appeal.

3. The Error Is Not Harmless
Finally, the State asserts that any error by the district court was harmless.
(Respondent's Brief, p.17.) The State is incorrect. If the district court orders dismissal
sua sponte, it must first give the petitioner twenty days' notice and allow tl1e petitioner to

respond to the notice. I.C. § 19-4906(b). The purpose of this requirement is to give the
petitioner an opportunity to challenge the decision before it is finalized.
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159-60 (Ct. App. 1986).

Baruth v.

Thus, this requirement is strict; it

makes no difference whether the petitioner's claims appear to be meritorious or not.
The Idaho Supreme Court has noted the following:
Under these circumstances the district court cannot be faulted for
determining that appellant's application for post-conviction relief is
meritless and dismissing the action. However, we do find error in the
court's failure to follow the provisions of I.C. § 19-2906(b). The district
court failed to notify appellant of its intention to dismiss the application and
thus offer appellant an opportunity to reply within twenty days. This error
requires that the judgment denying appellant's application for postconviction relief be reversed.
Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 129-30 (1978) (emphasis added). Thus, even in

cases where it appears that the petition is "meritless," error in providing notice requires
reversal.
The State cites Gomez v. State, 120 Idaho 632 (Ct. App. 1991) for the
proposition that harmless error applies in post-conviction cases. (Respondent's Brief,

I

I

Prior
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p.18.)

In Gomez, the Court of Appeals held that, although the district court erred in

failing to follow the twenty-day notice requirement, the error was harmless because
there was nothing in the record from which the petitioner could have established the
timeliness of his petition. Id. at 634. To the extent that this case is inconsistent with
Cherniwchan, it is not good law in this State as it is in conflict with Idaho Supreme Court
precedent. 1 The rule in Idaho is that even if the factual assertions in the application are
insufficient to make a prima facie showing of a right to relief, during the twenty-day
period for response to the dismissal motion the applicant is entitled to present
supplemental evidence to support the claims. See, e.g, Saykhamchone v. State, 127
Idaho 319 (1995).
On the merits of Mr. Ewell's claim, the State has adopted the district court's ruling
the underlying criminal case regarding Count VII with regard to luring and luring with a
sexual motivation.

(Respondent's Brief, p.20.) As Mr. Ewell has already briefed the

challenge to Count VII with regard to luring with a sexual motivation in docket number
35093, Mr. Ewell adopts the argument made in the Appellant's Brief in #35093 and
incorporates that argument herein by reference that luring and luring with a sexual
motivation are not substantially similar to an Idaho offense.

Regarding the prior

conviction of communication with a minor for an immoral purpose, the Supreme Court of
Washington has interpreted RCW 9.68A.090 to prohibit "communication with children
for the predatory purpose of promoting their exposure to and involvement in sexual
misconduct." State v. McNal/ie, 846 P.2d 1358, 1363-64 (Wash. 1993). The State has

1

In this context, the Gomez Court also stated the timeliness of a post-conviction petition
was a jurisdictional issue. Gomez, 120 Idaho at 634. This was specifically disavowed
in Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788 (Ct. App. 1999).
7

asserted that such a crime is substantially similar to attempted lewd conduct, attempted
sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, and attempted
enticing of children over the internet. (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) The State's argument
fails.

Regarding lewd conduct, I.C. § 18-1508 sets forth specific acts that constitute

lewd conduct, such as manual-genital, oral-genital, and genital-genital contact.
I.C. § 18-1508.

Washington's law requires only a showing of "sexual misconduct,"

which could be acts other than those required for a conviction of lewd conduct.
Attempted sexual battery requires findings not required by Washington's law, namely
that the crime be convicted by a person who is at least five years older than a minor
child who is sixteen or seventeen years of age.

I. C. § 18-1509A.

Finally, enticing

children over the internet requires the crime be committed by a person over the age of
18 against a child under the age of 16, and, obviously, that the perpetrator utilize the
internet.

I.C. § 18-1509A.

Washington's law applies to "any person" who

communicates with "a minor." RCW 9.68A.090. In sum, there are several important
distinctions between Idaho and Washington law regarding this subject.

These

dtfferences are sufficient at least, that it was error for the district court not to consider
the claim and give notice to Mr. Ewell of its intent to dismiss this claim.

Remand is

appropriate to fully litigate the issue in the district court.
It was Mr. Ewell's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss
after the information was amended. The district court was required to provide Mr. Ewell
with notice of why it believed any motion to dismiss would have failed and provide him
with an opportunity to rebut the allegations.

8

Because he was never afforded this

opportunity, the error was not harmless and Mr. Ewell's case must be remanded to
litigate this claim in district court.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ewell requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition
be reversed and that his case be remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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